亏掉1个亿，网红咖啡仅剩11家店，曾喊话“3年超瑞幸”Losing 100 million yuan, internet celebrity coffee only has 11 stores left, once shouting 'super lucky in 3 years'
本文来自微信公众号： 红餐网 ，作者：红餐编辑部，编辑：王秀清，原文标题：《亏掉1个亿！网红咖啡仅剩11家店，曾喊话“3年超瑞幸”》
T97的故事，是所有靠流量起盘的餐饮品牌都该看看的样本。
“咖啡你冲不冲，冲冲冲冲冲——”
2022年，这句魔性喊麦让T97咖啡一夜之间火遍全网。直播间单场观看人次飙到1000+万，月曝光量突破5亿。创始人李潇意气风发，喊出“35个月全面超越瑞幸”“一年开1001家店”的豪言。
五年后，豪言犹在耳畔，现实却已换了天地。李潇近日向媒体承认，品牌5年累计亏损超1亿元，目前全国仅剩11家门店。
从月曝光近5亿到全国仅剩11店，一个靠流量起飞的品牌，最终没能飞得更高。
01.
近5亿播放量，冲不出一杯好咖啡
T97的故事始于2021年。创始人李潇是一名连续创业者，此前创办过“环球捕手”“斑马会员”等平台。2021年4月，T97上线电商平台，同年11月在杭州天目里开出首家线下门店。
在品牌定位上，李潇一开始瞄准的是“减脂咖啡第一品牌”，后来放弃了这一自我设限的定位，转而以满足每天都要喝咖啡的刚需人群为核心。T97将产品分为基础款和创新款两个板块，结合热点、城市特征、节气等综合因素上新。产品价格带集中在15到35元之间，热销产品均价20元左右。
△图片来源：小红书截图
真正让T97打出名号的，是2022年9月的一场直播。主播大嘴妹伴随着魔性音乐一边重复洗脑rap一边夸张扭动，“咖啡你冲不冲，冲冲冲冲冲”迅速引爆网络，“大嘴妹”发起的合拍视频有超过13.7万人使用，#咖啡你冲不冲#单个话题播放量达4.8亿。
流量数据堪称惊人。在当时，新抖数据显示，30天内T97咖啡共直播31场，累计观看人次达到1.93亿人次，最高同时在线28万+，最高观看人次达1802万。仅在9月，抖音官方旗舰店涨粉就近90万。李潇曾曝光，800块成本撬动了600多万人进直播间。
流量带来了野心。在那场出圈直播后的一个月，李潇放出豪言：“一年开出1001家店，35个月全面超越瑞幸！原本定的是36个月，现在大嘴妹火了，我们团队经过严格计算，决定将进度再提前1个月。”
T97的门店装修由香港郑中设计事务所CCD设计，以极简主义风格打造咖啡消费场景，选址以写字楼大堂、高校、CBD商业综合体以及热门街道等为主。
李潇声称，当时虽然只有70多家门店，但“日均营收破3000，90%门店盈利”。后来，在发展的巅峰时期，T97签约门店超500家、实际开出200余家。
但喧嚣之下，隐患早已埋下。
流量数据虽然漂亮，但门店的实际销量却并不乐观。当时的美团数据显示，T97咖啡杭州第一家门店外卖月销量为1318杯，其他门店月销量只有几百杯。
在抖音、小红书等平台，大批测评博主和网友反馈“不好喝”“太腻，不如瑞幸”“一股奶精味，不像是咖啡”。消费者记住的是“咖啡你冲不冲”的旋律，而不是T97的咖啡味道。
02.
用电商思维做咖啡，
T97的每一步都踩了雷
外部环境的骤变，进一步加速了T97流量泡沫的破裂。
2023年下半年，库迪咖啡强势入局，咖啡价格战全面爆发。对于T97这样根基尚弱的玩家而言，被头部品牌联合形成的持久“绞杀”几乎是毁灭性的。自那以后，T97开始急速收缩，到2024年9月，门店数量缩减至90家左右；到今天，全国门店仅剩11家。
△图片来源：李潇抖音截图
但价格战只是加速了T97的坠落，真正的病灶在品牌内部。
首先是流量本身的问题。T97的爆红本质上是“内容出圈”而非“产品出圈”，消费者记住的是“咖啡你冲不冲”的魔性旋律，而不是T97的咖啡品质。当直播热度退潮，品牌没有留下可以持续吸引消费者的东西，流量来了又走了，品牌资产几乎为零。
更深层的问题在于，李潇在用电商思维做实体连锁。他此前做过平台，也在电商零售领域拿过成果。但他也曾承认，“和电商零售一夜千万级的销量不同，线下实体连锁靠的是一杯一杯、日复一日的累积”，他显然低估了线下生意的复杂度。
有分析指出，李潇用“成功学”的逻辑来招商——不讲单店盈利模型、不讲产品卖点、不讲选址逻辑，只讲怎么跟着发财。在签约的500多个加盟商中，有超过一半最终没有开成店，加盟商交了意向金占坑后，发现单店模型不清晰、市场口碑一般，最终选择主动“烂尾”。
这也引出了T97另一大致命失误：在没有清晰、可复制的盈利模型支撑下，就大规模放开加盟。与此同时，T97还推出“一年内关店退费”政策，闭店管理费、服务费全额退款，设备按五折回收。这项政策本意是降低加盟商风险，结果反而让部分盈利门店也选择提前关店止损，加速了品牌萎缩。
△图片来源：小红书截图
李潇自己也复盘了四大失误，除了加盟政策过于宽松外，还有——
旗舰店烧了800多万。“当时在流量的裹挟下，认为要开旗舰店造势”，在杭州天目里、IN77等顶流商圈开店，一家店一年仅租金就要百万级。但开出后才发现，旗舰店的爆火对标准店帮助不大；
团队超配，人力成本不堪重负。门店只有几十家时，T97团队已达150人，其中仅研发部门就有近20人。超配团队缺乏线下连锁经验，一个月产生数百万人力费用。李潇复盘：“如果一开始不招聘那么多人，而是随着门店增多再慢慢增加人手，或许能省下5000万的成本”；
选址成本“免费”变“浪费”。品牌内部组建了4个选址小组，采取“选址全免”政策，即为加盟商免费提供实地考察和选址评估服务。选址团队一个月差旅成本高达80多万，最夸张的是，去贵州出差50次，只落地了2家店。
其实，创始人所谈的种种失误，在于品牌还没有跑通单店模型，就急于用流量撬动规模，结果规模越大，失血越快。
结语
李潇早前曾说过：“从决定做线下的第一天，就是奔着万店品牌去的。”这个目标的出发点或许没错，但万店品牌的根基不是流量，而是供应链、单店模型、组织能力和持续的现金流。
而T97在这些基本功上，几乎每一项都交了白卷。
但李潇并没有就此退出咖啡行业。他在接受采访时表示，依然看好中国咖啡市场。“新品牌已经开出100多家线下门店，目前门店模型还在打磨中，这次我是以投资的方式入局的新品牌，把资源和资金给到专业团队来操盘。”
从亲自上场操盘到退居幕后投资，从“35个月超越瑞幸”到“门店模型还在打磨中”，李潇的姿态明显更低了。五年时间、一个亿的亏损，换来的是对咖啡行业更深的理解。
只是不知道，这次的“专业团队”能否把咖啡这门生意做得更好。
This article is from WeChat official account: Hongshi.com, author: Hongshi.com Editorial Department, editor: Wang Xiuqing, original title: "Lose 100 million yuan! Only 11 stores are left for online red coffee, and once called" 3 years of super luck "
The story of T97 is a sample that all food and beverage brands that rely on traffic to start their business should take a look at.
Do you brew coffee or not, brew it, brew it -
In 2022, this magical shout made T97 coffee become popular all over the internet overnight. The number of viewers in a single live broadcast room soared to over 10 million, and the monthly exposure exceeded 500 million. Founder Li Xiao is full of energy and boasts of "surpassing Luckin in 35 months" and "opening 1001 stores in a year".
Five years later, the bold words are still in our ears, but reality has changed. Li Xiao recently admitted to the media that the brand has accumulated losses of over 100 million yuan in the past five years, and currently only 11 stores remain nationwide.
From nearly 500 million monthly exposures to only 11 stores remaining nationwide, a brand that relied on traffic to take off ultimately failed to soar higher.
one
Nearly 500 million views, unable to make a good cup of coffee
The story of T97 began in 2021. Founder Li Xiao is a serial entrepreneur who has previously founded platforms such as "Global Catcher" and "Zebra Member". In April 2021, T97 launched its e-commerce platform and opened its first offline store in Tianmuli, Hangzhou in November of the same year.
In terms of brand positioning, Li Xiao initially aimed for being the "number one brand of fat reducing coffee", but later abandoned this self limiting positioning and instead focused on meeting the daily needs of coffee drinkers as the core. T97 divides its products into two categories: basic models and innovative models, and updates them based on comprehensive factors such as hotspots, city characteristics, and solar terms. The product price range is concentrated between 15 and 35 yuan, with an average selling price of around 20 yuan for popular products.
△ Image source: screenshot from Xiaohongshu
What really made T97 famous was a live broadcast in September 2022. The anchor Big Mouth Girl, accompanied by addictive music, repeated brainwashing rap while exaggerating and twisting. The phrase "Do you want to rush coffee? Rush, rush, rush" quickly exploded on the internet. The co production video initiated by Big Mouth Girl has been used by over 137000 people, and the # Coffee, Rush # single topic has reached 480 million views.
The traffic data is astonishing. At that time, according to data from New Douyin, T97 Coffee had a total of 31 live broadcasts within 30 days, with a cumulative view count of 193 million. The highest concurrent online viewership was over 280000, and the highest viewership was 18.02 million. In September alone, the official flagship store of Tiktok rose nearly 900000 fans. Li Xiao once exposed that the 800 yuan cost leveraged over 6 million people into the live streaming room.
Traffic brings ambition. One month after the viral live broadcast, Li Xiao boasted, "We opened 1001 stores in a year, surpassing Luckin in 35 months! We originally planned for 36 months, but now Big Mouth Girl has become popular. After strict calculations, our team has decided to advance the progress by another month
The store decoration of T97 was designed by Hong Kong Zhengzhong Design Firm CCD, creating a coffee consumption scene in a minimalist style. The locations mainly include office lobbies, universities, CBD commercial complexes, and popular streets.
Li Xiao claimed that although there were only over 70 stores at that time, "the daily revenue exceeded 3000, and 90% of the stores were profitable". Later, at the peak of its development, T97 signed over 500 stores and actually opened more than 200 stores.
But beneath the noise, hidden dangers have long been buried.
Although the traffic data is impressive, the actual sales of the store are not optimistic. At that time, Meituan data showed that T97 Coffee's first takeaway store in Hangzhou had a monthly sales volume of 1318 cups, while other stores had monthly sales of only a few hundred cups.
On platforms such as Tiktok and Xiaohongshu, a large number of evaluation bloggers and netizens reported that "it is not good to drink", "it is too greasy, it is not as good as Ruixing", "it tastes like cream, not like coffee". Consumers remember the melody of 'whether you brew coffee or not', not the taste of T97 coffee.
two
Using e-commerce thinking to make coffee,
Every step of T97 has been thunderous
The sudden change of the external environment further accelerated the bursting of the T97 flow foam.
In the second half of 2023, Kudi Coffee will enter the market strongly, and a comprehensive coffee price war will break out. For players with weak foundations like T97, the prolonged "strangulation" formed by the alliance of top brands is almost devastating. Since then, T97 has rapidly shrunk, with the number of stores reduced to around 90 by September 2024; As of today, there are only 11 stores left nationwide.
△ Picture source: screenshot of Li Xiao's Tiktok
But the price war only accelerated the decline of T97, the real problem lies within the brand.
Firstly, there is an issue with the traffic itself. The popularity of T97 is essentially about "content going viral" rather than "product going viral". Consumers remember the enchanting melody of "whether you can brew coffee or not", rather than the quality of T97's coffee. When the popularity of live streaming fades, the brand leaves nothing that can continue to attract consumers, traffic comes and goes, and brand assets are almost zero.
The deeper issue is that Li Xiao is using e-commerce thinking to create physical chain stores. He has previously worked on platforms and achieved success in the field of e-commerce retail. But he also admitted that "unlike the overnight sales of millions in e-commerce retail, offline physical chains rely on cup by cup, day by day accumulation," and he clearly underestimated the complexity of offline business.
Analysis has pointed out that Li Xiao uses the logic of "success learning" to attract investment - not talking about the profit model of individual stores, not talking about product selling points, not talking about site selection logic, only talking about how to follow and get rich. Among the over 500 franchisees who signed contracts, more than half ultimately did not open a store. After paying the intention deposit to occupy the pit, franchisees found that the single store model was unclear and the market reputation was average, and ultimately chose to actively "abandon the project".
This also leads to another fatal mistake of T97: opening up franchising on a large scale without a clear and replicable profit model to support it. At the same time, T97 has also launched a "one-year store closure refund" policy, which provides full refunds for store closure management fees and service fees, and equipment is collected at a 50% discount. The original intention of this policy was to reduce the risk of franchisees, but the result was that some profitable stores chose to close their stores early to cut losses, accelerating brand shrinkage.
△ Image source: screenshot from Xiaohongshu
Li Xiao himself also reviewed four major mistakes, in addition to the overly loose franchise policy, there were also——
The flagship store burned over 8 million yuan. At that time, under the influence of traffic, I thought we needed to open a flagship store to create momentum. I opened a store in top tier commercial districts such as Tianmuli and IN77 in Hangzhou, and the annual rent for one store alone was in the millions. But only after opening did I realize that the explosive popularity of the flagship store did not provide much help to the standard store;
The team is overloaded, and the labor cost is unbearable. When there were only a few dozen stores, the T97 team had already reached 150 people, including nearly 20 people in the R&D department alone. The overloaded team lacks offline chain experience, resulting in millions of manpower costs per month. Li Xiao's review: "If we hadn't recruited so many people at the beginning, but gradually increased manpower as the number of stores increased, perhaps we could have saved 50 million in costs;
The cost of site selection has turned from 'free' to 'wasteful'. Four site selection teams have been established within the brand, adopting a policy of "free site selection", which provides franchisees with free on-site inspection and site evaluation services. The site selection team incurred a monthly travel cost of over 800000 yuan, and the most exaggerated thing is that they only landed at 2 stores after 50 business trips to Guizhou.
In fact, the various mistakes mentioned by the founder lie in the fact that the brand has not yet achieved the single store model, and is eager to use traffic to leverage scale. As a result, the larger the scale, the faster the blood loss.
Conclusion
Li Xiao once said, "From the first day I decided to go offline, I aimed for the Wandian brand." The starting point of this goal may be correct, but the foundation of the Wandian brand is not traffic, but supply chain, single store model, organizational ability, and sustained cash flow.
And T97 has almost failed in every of these basic skills.
But Li Xiao did not withdraw from the coffee industry at this point. He said in an interview that he still has a positive outlook on the Chinese coffee market. The new brand has already opened more than 100 offline stores, and the store model is still being polished. This time, I entered the new brand through investment and assigned resources and funds to a professional team to operate
From personally managing the market to stepping back to investing behind the scenes, from "surpassing Luckin in 35 months" to "the store model is still being polished", Li Xiao's posture has noticeably decreased. Five years and a loss of one billion, in exchange for a deeper understanding of the coffee industry.
I just don't know if this' professional team 'can do a better job in the coffee business.